Introduction
To convince an audience of its validity a theory must possess an extensive historical narrative underpinning its development. Arguably, the international constitutionalisation debate still 1 Broadly, constitutionalisation is 'a process, extending constitutional structures to fora and layers of governance other than nations' however, differences of opinion among its advocates as to its precise implications makes delineating its character complex. 2 Understanding its historical development should make critique and analysis more coherent. This is not to propose that a single historical theory of constitutionalisation which all of its promoters can agree upon exists or that contemporary attempts to describe its relevance have not been worthwhile but rather that considering the grounds of the debate and its historical roots should enable fuller deliberation. This article attempts to examine the connection between the contemporary constitutionalisation debate and Verdross and considers his work in the context of his own emergent constitutionalisation theory. Further, the article attempts to identify those within the constitutionalisation debate whose ancestry are linked to Verdross. 4 'the modern idea of the constitution results from a basic shift that took place in conceiving the relationship between government and people: rejecting traditional orderings based upon status and hierarchy, it expressed the conviction that government, being an office established by the people, must be based on their
International constitutionalisation is a process by which international law moves beyond its sovereign foundations as well as its vertical and western bias, to a system of law founded on a process which is hierarchal, normative and structured.
Constitutionalism is a system of law comprising core norms indelibly linked to a particular structural order. Klabbers argues that constitutionalism is more than legalisation, 6 as such;
international constitutionalisation must represent more than a process of legalisation, jurification or other phenomena connected to the normal development of international law.
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As international law moves beyond a simplex order of equal subjects international constitutionalisation offers a framework to understand these developments and identifies the adoption of norms and structures that could rightly be described as constitutional.
Constitutional and public law structures are not exclusive to the domestic sphere. 8 Indeed
Walter argues that state and constitutionalism are separable and while the transfer to the nonstate sphere requires some contextual changes to adapt to another governance order these are not in-surmountable. International constitutionalisation does not offer a utopian vision of international law.
Recognised within these theories are incoherencies which suggest that the international legal order is, as yet, only a partially constituted system. 10 This piece considers what a Verdrossian understanding of constitutionalisation has to offer the participants in the current constitutionalisation debate and in doing so, attempts to gauge Verdross' impact. The variations within the constitutionalisation debate makes tracing Verdross' impact not as straightforward as drawing a direct lineage through the discussions. This article does not discuss the validity of the constitutionalisation debate. While important, the aim here is to understand one aspect of the constitutionalisation debate's evolution and not to provide a justification for alternatively undermining or underpinning the theory.
Instead, this article hopes to provide a basis for a more nuanced debate on constitutionalisation by providing a better understanding of its roots.
Verdross and International Law
Over the course of his long career Verdross engaged with a considerable number of topics, far more than can be considered here. 12 His career began prior to the First World War but it was in the age of multilateralism, after the creation of the League of Nations, that it gained significance. His impact on the debates surrounding the Weimar Constitution, the international community and as early as 1937, the nascent concept of jus cogens, are amongst his most prescient contributions. 13 Analysing Verdross' work in the post-Charter era is essential as it is here that he placed the Charter at the heart of both international law and community. 14 It is in community, jus cogens and multilateralism, that Verdross establishes his approach to international constitutionalisation.
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It is important to acknowledge that, as with all long careers, Verdross' approach evolved. there were two jus cogens categories. Eventually this became three classes. 16 Initially, his arguments on constitutionalisation were not linked to any specific institution but eventually were tied to the Charter. Thus, in presenting Verdross' constitutionalisation theory care is necessary to not overstate the development of a firm Verdrossian perspective.
This section will examine Verdross as a natural lawyer, his view of international community and finally discuss Verdross' approach to jus cogens and the role of multilateralism. This will touch upon the key aspects of what has arguably developed into Verdrossian constitutionalisation.
A. The Natural Law and International Community
While Verdross was ensconced within the Kelsenian School, having first been a student and then a colleague of Kelsen, it is from within the natural law that his international legal theory developed. 17 A natural law ethic is evident in two aspects of his work; community and jus cogens and both are pivotal in the development of a Verdross' theory on constitutionalisation.
This section addresses Verdross' understanding of community and the natural law. The StoicChristian tradition of international community, Aquinas' writing on the false nature of the subordination of the individual to the state and allegiance extending beyond the nation are significant in understanding Verdross' view of the role of international community. 18 This is evident in Verdross' opposition to totalitarian regimes but also his view of the international community as connected, but not subordinate, to the state.
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The views espoused by the Spanish School of international law are critical. 20 Suárez's notion that international law emerges in a 'universal community-orientated philosophy' where the community requires a legal order to govern their relations with each other influenced Verdross. 21 Verdross uses Suárez's community, one that may be adapted or changed, but which is based within law as an essential aspect of the functioning of a legal order, and adapts it for 20 th century international law.
As a natural lawyer, Verdross confronted the positivist approach to international law that questioned both its existence and operation. While Verdross sought to suggest, if possible, solutions to any divergences that arose in practice between the two theories, he still maintained that the natural law is the correct approach. 22 The claim that the law of nations has not developed sufficiently to be truly "law" is a key distinction between positivism and natural law. 23 For positivists international law is dependent on sovereign will.
A good contrast between a positivist and natural law approach to the international order is 34 Verdross, 'Reichsrecht' (n 12). 35 Verdross, 'Forbidden' ( n 13) 574. 36 Ibid 574.
identifying the attributes of this ethical minimum is almost as difficult as ascertaining the members of the international community.
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A key characteristic of Verdross' constitutionalisation is its reliance upon international community. Verdross divided the international community between the pre-and post-Charter era. In the former the community existed but was disorganised, in the latter period, the community became organised. 38 As well as being an example of the evolution of Verdross' own approach to international law, this foreshadows the importance of the Charter to
Verdross' constitutionalisation and marries the international community to the UN.
B. The Natural Law and Jus Cogens
Verdross was instrumental in the development of jus cogens as an important aspect of international law. 39 necessity is an anathema to the proponents of jus cogens norms. 42 Indeed, according to Verdross, the decisive element that elevates jus cogens is that 'they do not exist to satisfy the needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole community.' 43 As with international community, jus cogens are divided between the pre-and post-Charter era. 44 Verdross argues that neither treaty nor customary law is based upon the internal wrangling of Higher norms form a vital aspect of Verdross' international constitutionalism. Verdross asserts that positive law develops through a hierarchical system of norms instituted by organs in the international legal order. This is core to Verdross' monism and is also linked to his discourse on positivism versus the natural law. The international legal order's "unwritten constitution" is discoverable through an examination of the legal acts at the bottom of the hierarchy and tracing where these acts receive their authority. Verdross argues that the 47 Kunz (n 17) 398. 48 Ibid 400. 49 Verdross, 'Forbidden' (n 13) 572. 50 Verdross, 'Forbidden' (n 13) 571-572.
international community creates a positive legal system and this system is based on a common ethical understanding of core standards of international law reflected in jus cogens:
'As these norms are always created by an organized community of states, this writer calls them the "internal law of the community of States" (internes Staaten Gemeinschaftsrecht In the second category (in 1937 this held aspects of group two), Verdross places norms that substantiate humanitarian ideals that protect the individual over the state. 59 These norms, based upon humanitarian grounds, come within the conception of contra bonos mores but are more specific than the original group. The third group of norms evidences the chief transformation of jus cogens by the Charter and its articles on the use of force. 60 It centres the Charter at the core of international law and the newly organised community. 61 Verdross considered these three groups as incontrovertible parts of international law.
'a norm having the character of jus cogens can practically be created only by a norm of general customary law or by a general or multilateral convention. Indeed, the customary law of the former unorganized international society had already accepted certain limits on the liberty of states to conclude treaties by its recognition of the 56 Verdross, 'Forbidden' (n 13) 573 he followed this article several years later in Verdross, 'Dispositivum' (n 14) 217. 57 Verdross, 'Concept' (n 16), Verdross, 'Dispositivum' (n 14). 58 The two Verdross' influence as a pioneer of jus cogens is evident in the accepted characterisations of its operation.
C. Verdross and Multilateralism
The importance of multilateralism to Verdross is evident in the changes brought about by the Charter. A further example in his work is the debate on "the crises of neutrality" in the interwar period, particularly the legal ambiguity regarding neutrality and the League of Nations.
73
During this period, neutrality cycled between being an accepted aspect of international law, to a period of desuetude and back to primacy once again. 74 Contrasting neutrality under the Charter and the Covenant is useful in understanding Verdross' division of the disorganised and organised international community.
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In the optimism of the League's early years neutrality was no longer considered necessary.
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However as the League waivered in its attempts to maintain world peace neutrality was 77 Though it was exempted from military action it was involved in economic sanctions. This is difficult to reconcile with neutrality. 78 O'Donoghue (n 73) 59, There were also obviously many other factors in the Swiss withdrawal in 1938, at this point the new experiment in collective security had well and truly failed. disorganised international community Switzerland was able to maintain an equivocal position, but in the post-Charter era this was no longer credible. 79 Verdross contends that the Security Council, in inviting members to take part in actions, does not have the same scope for mandatory action which the Covenant possessed. 80 Theorie und Praxis, the UN had almost universal membership. 85 Verdross argued that the Charter constituted the constitution of the international community, though not necessarily a world constitution. This claim is no longer as radical as it once might have seemed. An evolution of the understanding of international law has occurred, regardless of disagreement as to the extent of this change.
Carty argues that the most difficult part of Verdross and Simma's constitutionalisation is the description of the transition from pre-civil to civil society reliant upon the Charter and its defects. 86 Norms must legitimate the international community for it to exist. This is not suggesting that Verdross or Simma believed that the Charter provides a perfect constitutional document. Such a claim of idealism would, as Carty points out, reject the notion of politics in the development of international law and belies the evolution of international law, an essential character of Verdross' constitutional perspective. 87 Carty identifies two themes in 84 Jellinek asserted that there is no way to compel a state to join the international community but Janzen correctly points out that, 'States join this community and abide by its rules because they have to do so. Life in international society can no longer be non-civic. 
D. Verdrossian Constitutionalisation
The degree of debt owed to Verdross by participants in the constitutionalisation debate that rely on jus cogens and community is examined next, but first it is crucial to establish a clear idea of what is encompassed within a Verdrossian constitutionalisation. Verdrossian constitutionalisation has two clear basis, jus cogens and international community. A third component, the Charter could also be included, but the degree to which this is essential to Verdrossian constitutionalisation is disputable. Certainly, the advent of the UN had a significant impact upon Verdross which is evident in his approach to constitutionalism and community. The importance of multilateralism is apparent early in his work, indeed, he recognised that 'this constitution is … not set down in a document as is the case in most modern states and the League of Nations, which is at present the most comprehensive partial legal community.' 90 Verdross argues that the legal order is hierarchical, interlinking with constitutional law, statutory law, executive decrees, administrative ordinances and decisions. 91 The international community establishes a legal order with common ethical 88 Ibid 715-716. 89 Carty identifies both of these as particularly German attitudes to international law and groups Germany and Austria together in their theories and attitudes to international law. The second, which is not discussed here, is the relationship of the people to the state 90 
Constitutionalisation in International Law
International constitutionalisation theories are many and diverse and analysing all of them in this article is impossible. Nonetheless, several theorists engaged in the constitutionalisation 92 Simma (n 19) 49. Within constitutionalisation the place of jus cogens varies between being a core essential and only partially representing the debate. 94 At times, jus cogens are used as ready-made constitutional norms, putting them in priority over obligations erga omnes, human rights or other aspects of international law. 95 Arguably, this conception of international constitutionalisation, linking jus cogens and community, comes from a Verdrossian development of jus cogens. 96 As with Verdross, jus cogens are combined with other aspects of international law such as the Charter, community and multilateralism in developing constitutionalisation theories.
Mosler, an early proponent of constitutionalisation, concentrates on the link between a common public order and international law norms. He differs in focus from Verdross in starting with erga omnes obligations. Whereas jus cogens are 'a cogent law limiting freedom of contract,' 97 it is erga omnes which underpin international constitutional principles.
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Further, Mosler did not identify the Charter as central to constitutionalisation, though he did suggest that at some point it may become vital. Mosler observes that the difficulty with treaties such as the Charter (and arguably the WTO Agreement) is that their object is restricted compared with the traditional understanding of the subject remit of a constitution thus marrying international constitutionalisation to the domestic evocations of constitution.
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As a near-contemporary of Verdross, Mosler's use of jus cogens and erga omnes is significant as it places them at the heart of a constitutional order which is established exclusive of an institutional structure and focuses instead on a common public order. Both
Mosler and Verdross are concerned with community, but it is in the character of the norms that underpin that community they differ. 'axiomatic premises other than State sovereignty.' 101 For Tomuschat, jus cogens are declaratory, as no additional corroboration is necessary. As such it is the differentiation between consensual and non-consensual elements of international law that is central to constitutionalisation. 102 Verdross' influence is apparent in the description of a shift from a disorganised to an organised community which is interdependent and reliant on nonconsensual norms of international law. 103 Similar to Mosler, Tomuschat suggests the limited competence of the Charter means that it cannot be considered a constitution of humankind. 104 Tomuschat's constitution is founded on the assumption that there are central rules to the system which states, from their inception, are instituted into and this is the basis upon which international law operates. He describes how meta-rules, the rules that lay out how other rules are to be made, enter into force and are implemented. This, he argues, together with executive and judicial functions, form the constitution of any system of governance. 105 Tomuschat is reliant on Verdross' development of jus cogens but his constitutionalism varies from Verdross to the extent that jus cogens exist as part of the international legal order, whereas for Verdross jus cogens are independent of community, though not necessarily independent of constitutionalism.
De Wet identifies constitutionalisation as the 'process of (re)organisation and (re)allocation of competencies among the subjects of the international legal order, which shapes the constitutionalism as a system of governance that 'provide[s] a legal framework for the political life of a community.' 107 De Wet argues that the international constitutional order consists of an international community, an international value system and a basic structure for its enforcement. 108 As a prime exponent of the second form of Verdrossian constitutionalisation, Fassbender is one of most ardent advocates of the Charter as a constitution for the global legal order. 131 Fassbender considers the establishment of the Charter as coming 'out of the fog' of indistinct constitutional rhetoric. 132 Significantly, he credits Verdross as one of the earliest proponents of constitutionalisation and firmly places Verdross within the Charter-based approach. 133 Fassbender's approach is significant as it assumes the UN is on a different plain to, for example, the WTO. Proof of its character, suggested by Fassbender, is the Charter's lack of definite guidance on non-original members of the UN signing or ratifying the Charter, which he suggests deviates from traditional treaty-making and elevates the Charter. 134 Fassbender Simma sees constitutionalism as combining two elements; first it has precedence over other law, and second it sets out a basic governance structure. 138 Simma applies this test to the Charter and finds it constitutional. 139 Yet, this test relies on the Charter to establish its content. This explanation could not be applied to either another treaty document, such as the WTO Agreement, or to a broader conception of constitutionalism that could be identified across several doctrines or documents. This characterisation of constitutionalism centres on the assumption that it will be the Charter that will fulfil the criterion. 140 The Charter is combined with jus cogens and erga omnes to establish a version of constitutionalisation centred on the state and Charter as the fulcrum around which international law operates.
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This is major departure from the Verdrossian perspective which is more incremental in its division of international law into the pre-and post-Charter eras and is not centred on the Charter as the source of constitutionalism. While Verdross placed the Charter within constitutionalisation this was in combination with jus cogens which are the foundation of the international legal order. In displacing jus cogens and placing such emphasis on the Charter arguably Simma is moving beyond the core of Verdross' theory of constitutionalisation.
Verdross' perspective on the role of jus cogens in constitutionalism is evident in most of the theories just discussed; however how well this has been translated into a fully realised A purist Verdrossian approach to constitutionalisation is established by a community which creates a positive legal order with core common standards as epitomised by jus cogens. The traces of jus cogens, community and international governance evident in each of the theories establishes a Verdrossian vein, though not emulation in the contemporary debate. Arguably, it is the first group which centres upon core norms that has the most in common with
Verdross. The second Charter-based group, in remaining so close to the Charter are, arguably, continue the weakest aspect of Verdross' theory.
Conclusion
Fassbender argues that, in 1926, Verdross was the first to make use of international constitutionalism. 142 Indeed, while constitutional language may be traced to Holtzendorff, in 1877, or Bridgeman in 1911, 143 Verdross was the first to use it in a systematic fashion.
Simma argues, that by constitution, Verdross meant 'the norms that regulate the basic order of a community, that is, its structure, organisation, and allocation of competences.' 144 In this, Verdross relies on core principles such as jus cogens, the overall unity of the system of international law and the hierarchy or 'pyramid' of sources of law. His wider contribution to the development of jus cogens, the Charter and a natural law ethic is also evident and assures that even where Verdrossian constitutionalisation is disputed or considered ill-advised the impact of his work is still felt. 142 Fassbender, 'The United Nations Charter' (n 90) 28, indeed Simma makes a similar claim, Simma, 'Bilateralism' (n 93) 259. 143 Opsahl (n 1)761. 144 Simma, 'Bilateralism' (n 93) 123.
In addressing Verdross' impact upon international constitutionalisation there are certain key motifs in his work. The most obvious of these is his reliance on jus cogens, community and the Charter. In arguing for a more nuanced international legal order beyond the remit of the pure consent of states, in acknowledging that the international law cannot simply be explained away by sovereignty and is, in fact, a complex legal order, Verdross has been highly influential. As one of the first proponents of a coherent constitutional analysis of international law Verdross' offers a rationale understanding of the place of constitutionalisation within the international legal order. While Simma located this constitutionalisation within the Charter, arguably it is Verdross' reliance on identifiable core norms of a higher order, which is most significant for the contemporary debate. The evolution and role of jus cogens and the Charter as well as other aspects of the debate are intrinsically linked to Verdross and require a return to him to understand their development. Indeed, in re-examining some of Verdross' claims it may lead to rejection of the constitutionalisation cause but it may also engender more coherence in the claims made upon Verdross and constitutionalisation more generally.
